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"Of the ancients Epicurus received most favorably Anaxagoras, although 
he opposed him on certain points, and Archelaus, the teacher of Socrates."
This astonishing statement made by Diogenes Laertius deserves serious con­
sideration (D.L. 10.12). It is, of course, impossible to prove that Anaxagoras' 
philosophy directly influenced Epicurus. The most that I can hope to show is 
that Epicurus in his interpretation of particular philosophic problems departed 
from Democritus and adopted a point of view similar to that of Anaxagoras.
For Anaxagoras' methodology perhaps the most interesting fragments are 
those which deal with the color of snow. Sextus Empiricus writes: "We compare
that which is perceived by the mind with the phenomena, just as Anaxagoras 
compared the proposition: 'Snow is congealed water, water is black, and,
therefore, snow is black' with 'Snow is white'" (59A97). According to Cicero, 
Anaxagoras said that snow did not even seem white to him because he knew that 
the water from which it was congealed was black (59A97). Ibis' interpretation, 
however, is doubtful, since a scholiast states specifically that Anaxagoras 
said that the black was in the white and the white in the black (59B10).
Anaxagoras contrasted the evidence from sense perception with contradictory 
evidence from deduction. The evidence from deduction was what Epicurus called 
"evidence to the contrary."
If Anaxagoras intended to demonstrate that snow was both black and white, 
he could have done so by using the following arguments:
(1) Snow is congealed water.
Water is black.
Therefore, snow is black.
2.
(2) If snow is black, sight is false.
But sight is not false.
Therefore, snow is not black.
(3) If snow is either black or white, either sight or logos is false. 
Neither sight nor logos is false.
Therefore, snow is not either black or white.
(4) If snow is both black and white, both sight and logos are true.
Both sight and logos are true,
Therefore, snow is both black and white.
Anaxagoras’ vise of an argument of the first type is attested by the 
passage in Sextus Empiricus quoted above. An argument of the second type is 
found in fragment B 5 of Anaxagoras: "If all things are more, there would be
more than all; It is not possible that there should be more than all; There­
fore, all things are always equal (i.e. not more)." The third argument is a 
modified form of the type used by Zeno and by Gorgias in his Concerning Non- 
being . Zeno’s scheme reads as follows: "If S exists, it must be either P or
Not-P, but if it can be neither P nor Not-P, S does not exist."1
If Anaxagoras had started with the postulate, "Snow is both black and 
white," he would have been faced with the necessity of providing confirmatory 
evidence or at least of showing that the postulate is not inconceivable. By 
pouring white and black drop by drop from one into the other, he could have 
shown that both black and white were in the mixture and that that which is 
present in a mixture is not always distinguishable by the senses. We know that
N
Anaxagoras actually performed this experiment. Sextus Empiricus writes as 
follows: "’Because of our feebleness,’ he (Anaxagoras) says, ’we cannot discori.
the true,' and he uses as proof of their unreliability the gradual change of 
colors. For if we should take two colors, black and white, and then we should 
pour them drop by drop from one to the other, sight would not be able to
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distinguish the gradual alterations, although they subsist naturally" (59B21). 
That which we cannot discern is in the mixture; but also that which we can 
discern is in the mixture. We may, I believe, go one step farther, and assume 
that that which is present in the sense perception is in the mixture.
The experiment itself might be the basis of an inference in an entirely 
different context. From an experiment similar to the one I have described, 
Anaxagoras drew the conclusion that prior to the separation, when all things 
were together, there was no color visible at all "for the mixture of all things 
prevented it" (59B4).
When Anaxagoras said that we cannot discern the true, he meant that we 
cannot discern something which is a part or portion of the mixture. We cannot 
discern the black or the white in a mixture of black and white. It would seem 
to follow, therefore, that we can discern visible objects and that these are 
true. This assumption is supported by a fragment from Melissus which may, in 
fact, be an attack on Anaxagoras.2 The passage reads as follows: "For if
there are many, it is necessary for them to be such as I say the one is. For 
if there are earth and water and air and fire and iron and gold, and the living 
and the dead, and black and white, and the other things which people say are 
true, if, indeed, this is the case, and we rightly see and hear, it is necessary 
for each thing to be such as seemed good to me at first" (30B8). The word 
aleH:hes (true) in this passage seems to mean real or actual.^
What kind of evidence led Anaxagoras to postulate the nous? Anaxagoras 
^describes the nous as follows: "Other things have a portion of everything,
but nous is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but it is alone 
by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it
would have a share of all things, if it were mixed with anything. --  It has
all judgment (gnome) about everything and the greatest strength. All those
things which have life both the greater and the less nous controls (kratei).
And the whole revolution nous controls (ekratese) so that it revolved in the
beginning. --  And all those things which were mingled together and separated
off and separated out nous knows (εγνω). And whatever was going to be and 
whatever was, whatever is not now, and whatever is now and whatever will be, 
all these nous organizes (diekosroese), and this revolution in which are now 
revolving the stars, the sun, the moon, the air and the fire that are being 
separated off. And the revolution itself caused this separating off. And the 
dense is separated off from the rare, the hot from the cold, the bright from 
the dark, and the dry from the moist" (59B12). ^  To support his statement "Nous 
was mixed with nothing" Anaxagoras argued: "But if nous were mixed with any­
thing else, it would be mixed with all things; but nous is not mixed with all 
things; therefore, nous is not mixed with anything else." If Anaxagoras held 
that the regularity in the movements of the heavenly bodies was a proof (tekmerion) 
of the existence of nous, his argument might have read: "If there is order,
there is nous ; there is order; therefore, there is nous." The orderly movement 
of the stars was a phenomenon which provided a vision of the non-evident. From 
the nature of the phenomenon we can draw conclusions about the nature of the 
non-evident. This is the meaning of Anaxagoras' famous statement: οψος γάρ
των αδήλων τα φαυνόμενα (59B21a).^  Anaxagoras undoubtedly made use of 
analogy. The nous of man knows, organizes and controls; accordingly, the nous 
of the cosmos knows, organizes and controls. In man the reasoning process is 
separate from the physical act. So too in the cosmos the nous organizes the 
revolution, but the revolution itself brings about the separation of the physical 
components.
In the area of human activity, nous, material causes, and an indeterminate 
number of other causes were used by Anaxagoras to explain the sequence of events. 
The evidence suggests that he did not recognize a system of antecedent causes
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which determined an activity or event. There was » of course, no material cause 
to explain the existence of nous itself. We have to bear in mind the very 
limited function which Anaxagoras attributed to nous when we read the comments 
of Plato, Aristotle and Simplicius. Plato: "I saw that he did not use the
nous at all --  but he assigned as causes air, fire and water and many other
absurd things." Aristotle: "Anaxagoras uses nous as a device for the formation
of the cosmos, and when he is at a loss as to why something is of necessity, 
then he drags it in, but in other respects he uses everything as a cause of 
those things which are happening rather than nous." Simplicius: "Anaxagoras,
leaving nous on one side, as Eudemus says, and introducing spontaneity (auto­
mat iz3n), proves many things" (59A47). We know also that Anaxagoras argued 
that none of the things that happen happened according to fate and that fate 
was an empty word (59A66). A scholiast reports that according to Anaxagoras 
all human affairs are directed by tyche (59A66).
In Anaxagoras* philosophy, however, a man’s sophia was based not only on 
his ability to discern the non-evident through the phenomena, but on his under­
standing of logic and mathematics. This is made abundantly clear by the fol­
lowing passages: "It is not possible for Being not to be" (59B3); "It is not
possible that there should be more than all" (59B5); "Since the portions of 
the large and of the small are equal in number, in this way all things would 
be in all" (59B6); and "Since it is not possible that there should be a smallest, 
it could not be separated" (59B6). Complementing man's powers of reasoning was 
his ability to make conjectures. Anaxagoras assumes that if "a mixture of all 
things" similar to that which existed prior to the formation of our cosmos 
existed elsewhere, it would be followed by a separating off similar to that in 
our cosmos, and the emergence of a world which would have the same physical 
structure as our world and the same type of society that we have now (59B4). 
Anaxagoras introduces this passage with the words : "It is necessary to suppose
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that" (χρη ôoxetv). A doxa, if we base our interpretation on this passage, 
is not confirmed and is not contradicted by evidence to the contrary. In a 
passage in the Metaphysics in which he argued that Democritus, Empedocles, 
Parmenides and Anaxagoras identified perception and knowledge, regarded per­
ception as alteration, and consequently said that the phenomena which is 
according to perception is true, Aristotle attributes to Anaxagoras the saying, 
"The things that are (ta onta) will be such as men assume them to be" (1009b25-8= 
59A28). The sayirj attributed to Anaxagoras may very well be, as Cherniss 
suggested, of a moralistic nature with no significance for Anaxagoras' theory 
of sense perception at all.®
In his interpretation of many particular points Epicurus seems to have 
parted company with Democritus and adopted a point of view similar to that of 
Anaxagoras. The most common type of argument used by Epicurus has the following 
pattern: If A, then B; Not B; Therefore, not A. This is the type used by
Anaxagoras in B5.7 Epicurus’ argument: "Nothing comes into being from that
which is non-existent, for everything would come from everything and there would 
be no need of seeds" (Ep. 1.38) can be restated as follows: "If something should
come into being from that which is non-existent, everything would come from 
everything, and there would be no need of seeds; everything does not come from 
everything, and there is need of seeds; therefore, nothing comes into being 
fnprn that which is non-existent." Similarly, the argument, "If there were no 
place, which we call void and space and intangible nature, bodies would have 
nowhere to be and nothing through which to move" (Ep. 1.40) may be expressed as: 
"If there were no void, bodies would have nowhere to be and nothing through 
which to move; bodies have somewhere to be and something through which to move; 
therefore, there is void.^
In my discussion of Anaxagoras I pointed out that in the experiment in 
which he poured white and black drop by drop from one into the other he was
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demonstrating that it was not inconceivable that black and white were in the 
mixture although'they were not distinguishable by the senses. Epicurus argued 
that it was not impossible that there were emanations, and Lucretius that it 
was not inconceivable that bodies which cannot be seen exist. Epicurus wrote:
"What is more, there are impressions similar in shape to the solids, surpassing 
the phenomena by far in their fineness. For it is not impossible that such 
emanations should arise in that which surrounds them" (Ep. 1.46). Lucretius, 
trying to show that bodies which cannot be seen exist in things, uses the 
analogy of wet clothes spread out in the sun to dry. The moisture, which
Q
eyes cannot see at all, is broken up into small particles (1.266-7 and 305-10).
In our consideration of Epicurus' sense perception we have to distinguish 
between Epicurus' concept of the true and his belief that the properties of 
the impression (phantasia) were the same as the properties of the solid body.
Two crucial passages read as follows: (1) Since all that is observed or grasped
by apprehension of the mind is true (Ep. 1.62); and (2) "Whatever impression 
of shape or of properties10 we get by apprehension of the mind or the senses, 
this is the shape of the solid object, if it comes about because of the sue- 
cessive repetition of the eidolon (κατα το εξηε πύκνωμα) or because of the 
remaining effect of the eidolon (έγκατ<£λεεμμα του εεδώλου Ep. 1.50).H
When a man views a tower from a distance, his impression reveals the tower as 
small and round, but when he sees the same tower from a closer range, his impression 
reveals the tower as large and square. Both impressions are true. When the 
impression reveals the tower as small and round, the eidolon, that is, the film 
of atoms in the air which have broken away from the solid object, is small and 
round. The limits belonging to the eidola have been broken off by their move­
ment through the air (ff. 247 ( 2 0 9 ) ) He does not assume, however, that the 
properties of the first impression, which shows the tower as small and round,
are the properties of the solid object, because he does not experience a successive
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repetition of the eidolon and his memory image (i.e. the remaining effect of 
the eidolon) contradicts the impression. His memory image, whether of the tower 
or of similar towers, tells him that a tower is large and probably square. He 
does not regard the impression of the small and round tower as accurately re­
producing the properties of the tower, but he accepts the impression of the 
large and rectangular tower as doing so.
Falsehood and error are to be found in the doxa. Epicurus writes: "False­
hood and error always lie in the addition made by the doxa regarding what is 
waiting to be confirmed or not contradicted, and which is subsequently not con­
firmed or is contradicted"; and "If it is not confirmed or contradicted, false­
hood arises; if it is confirmed or not contradicted, the true" (Ep. 1.50 and 51). 
Confirmatory evidence is defined and illustrated in the following passage in 
Sextus Empiricus: "Confirmatory evidence is apprehension through a clear view
(enargeia) that that which is conjectured (to_ doxazomenon) is such as it was 
conjectured to be, as, for example, when Plato is approaching from a distance,
I suppose and conjecture (doxazo) with reference to the distance that it is 
Plato, and when he has come nearer with the distance being reduced, there is 
further evidence that it is Plato, and this is confirmed by the clear view itself 
(enargeia, fr. 247 (212)).^1'· The clear view in this example meets the two con­
ditions laid down by Epicurus for an impression whose properties were the properties 
of the object; it is based on a successive repetition of the eidolon, and con­
sistent with the remaining effect of the eidolon. Contradictory evidence is 
also evidence from the phenomena. Epicurus writes in his first Epistle : "What
is more, we must not believe that every magnitude exists in the atoms in order 
that the phenomena may not contradict us" (1.55).
Although in some cases the properties of the impression were similar to 
the properties of the eidolon rather than to those of the sense object, in all 
cases the property of the affection or feeling (pathos) is the same as the
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property of that which produces the pathos. Sextus Empriicus writes : "For
just as the primary affections (pathe), that is, pleasure and pain, come about 
from some things which produce them and according to those very things which 
produce them, as, for example, pleasure from those things which are pleasant, 
and pain from those things which are painful, and it is not possible that that 
which is productive of pleasure should not be pleasant or that that which is 
productive of pain should not be painful, but it is necessary for that which 
causes pleasure to be pleasant and that which causes pain to be painful in 
nature" (fr. 247 (203)).15
So far as I have been able to discover there is nothing in the fragments 
of Democritus which would indicate that he believed that the properties of the 
impression were the properties of the object. The evidence leads to a very 
different conclusion. According to Democritus the names of the sense impressions 
are according to common usage: "By customary usage color, by customary usage
sweet, by customary usage bitter; in truth atoms and void" (68B125 cf.9). Demo­
critus wrote also: "In reality we understand nothing exactly, but only as it
changes according to the disposition of our body, and of those things that come 
in upon it and of those that resist" (68B9). On the other hand, the sense 
perceptions provide the evidence on the basis of which inferences can be drawn: 
"There are two forms of knowledge, one genuine, one obscure. To the obscure 
belong all these, sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. But the genuine is
separated from this --  When the obscure can no longer see more minutely or
hear or smell or taste or perceive in touch, butait is necessary to carry out 
our investigations^ to something finer" (68B11).-*-6
The term homoeomery does not appear in any of the fragments of Anaxagoras. 
Aristotle, however, referred to the elements of Anaxagoras as homoeomeries,17 
and defined the term as meaning that the part was the same as the whole.·*·® The 
term homoeomery was probably applied to Anaxagoras' philosophy by Aristotle, if
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indeed Anaxagoras did not use the term himself, because Anaxagoras argued that 
that from which an entity emerges has predominant parts which are the same as 
the predominant parts of the entity. Anaxagoras wrote: "For how could hair 
come from that which is not hair and flesh from that which is not flesh"?
(59B10). Epicurus seems to have used the term homoeomery to indicate the 
likeness which exists between that which emerges and that from which it emerges. 
For instance, he argued that the current which moves away from that which is 
speaking or making a noise was broken up into homoeomerius particles (όμουομερεος 
δγκους) which preserved an affinity with one another and a distinctive unity 
which stretched back to that which sent them forth (Ep. 1.52). These homoeomerous 
particles, we may assume, have the same characteristics as the whole from which 
they emerged. The essential similarity between the eidolon and the solid body 
is denoted by the term homoeomereity. A fragment from Epicurus’ Concerning 
Nature has the lines: "Preserving the same homoeomereity with the solid object"
(23.33.2-4) .-1-9 Arrighetti connects this fragment with an earlier fragment from 
Concerning Nature: "In the same position and order" (23.11.91) ,20 and with lines
in Lucretius which read as follows : "Because the eidolon has an appearance and
shape similar to the body from which it is said to have poured forth" (4.50-2).
In his discussion of the shapes which Plato attributed to the four elements in 
the Timaeus (55D-56C), Epicurus wrote in Concerning Nature ; "The shape which 
he (Plato) attributes to them are not (sc. incompatible) with the affections 
which arise because of these four elements, especially the first two (i.e. fire 
and earth, cf.27.22), or more precisely, that which has already acquired homoeo­
mereity with the phenomena (i.e. fire)" (27.27.1511). Here the term homoeomereity 
denotes the correspondence between the shape and the affection.
Kerferd stated the grounds for believing that Epicurus recognized the 
existence of molecules - a group of atoms in an entity which are such that they 
can produce a particular attribute in the entity.^ For example, Plutarch refers
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to heat-producing atoms in wine (fr. 60), and Diogenes Laertius to atoms which 
are productive of fire (D.L. 10.115). The four elements of the soul, fire, 
air, pneuma and a fourth nameless power were molecules capable of producing 
such qualities as anger, fear and composure (Luc. 3.287-306).^2 These molecules 
were not merely anger-producing atoms or fear-producing atoms but they were 
complexes designated by such terms as fire and air. In his recent book Long 
wrote: "It is probable, though not certain, that Epicurus would have regarded
OO
a pool of water as a compound of smaller compounds - molecules of water.
Although the evidence should not be pushed too far, it would seem to indicate 
that Epicurus was concerned about the particular problem raised by Anaxagoras - 
the continuity which exists between that which emerges and that from which it 
has emerged. Epicurus does not seem to have been completely satisfied with 
Democritus' argument that sensible qualities could be explained by the non- 
sensible attributes of the atoms, such as size and shape, if the atoms pro­
ductive of a certain quality were not themselves identifiable as a single group.
There is evidence that Epicurus used the phrase opsis ton adulón ta 
phaenomena. Plutarch refers to those who say that the phenomena hold evidence 
for the non-evident (adâla, fr. 263). A passage from Philodemus in what appears 
to be a quotation from Epicurus refers to men who are not able to observe the 
relationship which exists between the phenomena and the unseen (fr. 212). And 
finally, Diogenes Laertius writes: "The fact that we see and hear subsists
just as feeling bodily pain subsists. Accordingly, it is necessary to infer 
from the phenomena about the non-evident (adela, D.L. 10.32).
Epicurus diverged from the views of Democritus in his interpretation of 
chance and necessity as well. Democritus rejected chance (tyche*) altogether, 
arguing that it was a cause non-evident to human reasoning (68A70 cf.A68). 
According to Aristotle, Democritus referred all those things which nature uses 
to necessity; Aetius states that Democritus termed the resistance, movement and
impact of matter (i.e. the atoms) necessity (68A66). Pseudo-Plutarch in his 
Stromateis attributes to Democritus the statement that the causes of those 
things which are coming into being now have no beginning, and that all that 
has come into being and is and will be, without qualification, is bound by 
necessity from infinite time in the past" (68A39). Here the term necessity 
may mean no more than the movement of the atoms. With these passages we might 
compare the statement of Diogenes of Oenoanda to the effect that Democritus 
said that there was no free movement for the atoms because of their collision, 
and that from this it appeared that all things were moved according to necessity 
(68A50). A passage from Diogenes Laertius tells us that the dine"* (vortex) was 
necessity (68A1 (45)).24 In these examples the term anagke seems to indicate 
something which has come to pass as the result of causes which are not determined. 
It did not denote regularity or order. In the area of huirán activity, Demo­
critus used a system of antecedent causes. Digging, for instance, was the 
cause of both finding the treasure and planting the olive tree (68A68).
Several passages indicate that Epicurus was critical of Democritus' use 
of anagke. Epicurus wrote: "We must not suppose that the kósmoi have one shape
according to necessity";2^ and again, "For it is not necessary for a gathering
of atoms or a vortex to come into being --  as is supposed, by necessity" (Ep. 2.90)
He does, however, offer as a possible explanation for the fact that some stars 
wander from their course but others do not the conjecture that the stars were 
so constrained by necessity that some moved along a regular orbit and others 
along one which was irregular (Ep. 2.113). A movement which Democritus wculd 
have attributed to necessity was usually explained by Epicurus in terms of the 
physical phenomena. For example, Epicurus offers several explanations which 
are in accordance with the physical phenomena for the rising and setting of the 
sun, moon and the other heavenly bodies (Ep. 2.92).
In an important passage in which he was discussing the nature of the
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heavenly bodies Epicurus referred to that which cannot be otherwise. He wrote 
as follows: "We must realize that that which may happen in several ways and 
is capable of being otherwise does not belong here" (Ep. 1.78).^ These lines 
and passages in Lucretius suggest that Epicurus attached considerable importance 
to the regularity of nature. In the first book of Lucretius we find such 
sentences as : "If things should come from nothing — ~ the same fruits would
not be constant on the trees" (156 and 165); "But now because the several 
things are born from specific seeds" (169); "Whatever is born is revealed 
while favorable seasons are present and the life-giving earth sends forth 
safely her delicate offspring to the shores of light" (177-9). This pattern 
of regularity which Epicurus recognized in the heavens and in nature itself has 
strong affinities to the order established by Anaxagoras' nous.
Some early thinker, if not Democritus himself, seems to have argued that 
human volition was restricted by the agglomeration of atoms. To this Epicurus 
was strongly opposed. A passage from his writings reads as follows: "Since
the cause is to be found in men themselves and not in the primeval agglomeration 
or in the necessity of that which surrounds us and comes in upon us in accordance 
with spontaneity"(Arrighetti, 31.27.1-9).^7 Epicurus distinguished between
"that which is in our power" (τδ παρ’ ήμόΓς) and chance (tyche1 Ep. 3.133-4).
28Tyche is not a god or an unreal cause (Ep. 3.134). It is that which makes 
possible opportunities for good or evil. As Epicurus wrote: "Opportunities
for great good or evil are provided by this" (Ep. 3.134-5). We found earlier 
that Anaxagoras recognized the nous of the individual as a cause ; Epicurus'
"that which is in our power" denotes those particular events which are subject 
to man's decision.
Although we know that Anaxagoras used spontaneity (automaton) and tyche\ 
there are not sufficient grounds for us to assume that Epicurus' tyche was 
influenced by Anaxagoras. It may have been drawn, in fact, from Democritus'
ΙΑ,
use of observed phenomena as thé basis of inference. Cole has argued con­
vincingly that five accounts of the origin of technology and society found 
in. Diodorus Siculus,, Vitruvius, Lucretius, the 90th Epistle of Seneca, and 
Tzetzes* Commentary on Hesiod have a common source in Democritus.^  For 
instance, as Lucretius relates, when fire scorched the forests with heat, 
there flowed from the veins of earth a convergent stream of silver and gold. 
Then it occurred to men that these when liquefied by heat could flow into any 
shape and appearance that they might wish (5.1255-63). Democritus’ use of 
the eventus fortuitus would seem to be substantiated by a passage in Aelian 
in which Democritus is said to have referred to the mating of a jackass and 
a mare by chance (kata tychen), and to have argued that men learned from this
the custom of raising mules (68A151). The whole concept of eventus fortuitus
/s
seems to be inconsistent with Democritus' interpretation of tyche. The in­
consistency, however, lies in the term eventus fortuitus itself. For Democritus 
the convergent stream of silver and gold was an observed phenomenon on the 
basis of which an inference could be drawn. Only in Epicurus’ system was it 
a tyche*or eventus fortuitus.^
It is, I believe, clear that Epicurus adopted an interpretation of the 
impression which was alien to Democritus’ atomic theory and closer to that of 
Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras may have believed that the qualities of the impression 
accurately reproduced the attributes of the objects ; and he certainly regarded 
the objects of sense perception as true. He held that that from which an entity 
emerges had predominant parts which were the same as the predominant parts of 
the entity. Anaxagoras' experiments suggest that he was aware in some degree 
of the principle of confirmatory evidence and evidence to the contrary. His 
form of argumentation was similar to that of Epicurus. What is more, Anaxagoras 
used the term doxa to denote an opinion for which there is no confirmatory 
evidence or evidence to the contrary. Anaxagoras made extensive use of
material causes hut attached particular significance to the regularity of 
the movement of the heavenly bodies. When Epicurus read the writings of 
Anaxagoras, he must have found himself in agreement with many of his basic 
assumptions.
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